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very study of the British Expeditionary Force of1914-18 must
deal with the conditions under
which that war was fought, the commanders who sent soldiers to fight
in those conditions, and the enormous casualties which the conditions and the attacks produced. The
risk of being mesmerized by the
horror of the war is substantial.
Tim Travers, however, has been able
to look at the casualties and the
British High Command without
sacrificing clear analysis. His book,
How the War Was Won, is exceedingly stimulating in the process.
Indeed, after reading this book, it is
impossible to avoid speculating on
the continuing debate over weapons, strategy and tactics which
marked the interwar years and even
later.

E

Arguments about mechanical
and mobile warfare dominated
military thinking throughout the
Second World War and the two
dominant weapons in this regard
were the airplane and the tank. By
1944 military planners had
assumed that future campaigns
would follow the pattern offighting
in North Africa where armour
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predominated. Consequently in
1944
there
occurred
a
reinforcement crisis in Northwest
Europe where a very different
pattern prevailed. There are still
air power advocates who believe
that wars can be won without
ground forces, and still some who
seem unaware that armour without
infantry leads to a most precarious
existence. But we should not forget
that the development of aerial
warfare and the "blitzkrieg" were
the most important military
concepts which developed after
1918. Travers, of course, ends his
work with the armistice in 1918,
but the issues that fill his book are
very much alive in following
decades.
In terms of tactical evolution,
it is not too much to claim that this
book is the most thoughtful study
yet produced of the British
Expeditionary Force during the last
years of the war.
Travers
concentrates on three themes.
First, he examines the extent to
which final victory can be
attributed to the British
Expeditionary Force's command
structure and senior leadership.
Although he is critical ofHaig and
the
High Command, his
investigation avoids the simplistic
condemnations which still mar
many studies of the British
Commander-in-Chief.
The second theme which runs
throughout the book is an Finally,
a third theme which runs
throughout the book is the notion
that the war was really over by the
time the 1918 German spring
offensive ended. Travers argues
that "by not losing and by staying
in existence, rather like the RAF in
the Battle of Britain, the BEF and
French Army essentially took the

initiative away from the German
Army." (p.llO) But even as he
concludes this argument, he
reminds us that "if one reads
history forward and not backwards,
if was still far from obvious in July
[1918] how this war was to be won,
or who was to win it." Moreover,
the war did not begin to wind down
in August 1918 if one considers the
casualties.
For the British Expeditionary
Force the losses of the "Last
Hundred Days" were greater than
the casualties at Passchendaele.
The high casualties resulted from
many factors, but one of them in
Travers' view was that the tactical
methods developed in this stage of
the war did not lead to a successful
combination of all arms, including
tanks and airplanes. Rather there
appeared to develop a system which
relied more on traditional methods
with artillery predominating.
Travers acknowledges that there
was effort put into developing an
all-arms tactical system, but it did
not mature.
It is, ofcourse, possible to argue
with a thesis that one finds thoughtprovoking and fascinating.
Consider for example "the story of
the tanks after the initial surprise
on 8 August." (p.127) Travers
correctly objects to John Terraine's
exaggerated claim that by the
fourth day of the offensive "the
number of tanks had dropped to
six." One can agree with this
correction and still be troubled by
the explanation offered for the large
number oftanks being knocked out
- "the obvious reason for this was
the failure of the planning staff,
whether at corps, army, or GHQ
level, to protect the tanks from
anti-tank guns through the use of
smoke, artillery, aircraft, or better
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infantry-tank tactics." All ofthese
good things should have occurred,
but the obvious reason for the large
number of tank casualties still can
be attributed to the slow speed and
fragility of the tanks themselves.
What the tank corps most needed
in 1918 was better and more
reliable tanks. The possibilities
existed in 1918 for great success
with better technical equipment.
But lacking the equipment it is not
surprising to find that commanders
turned increasingly to more
traditional forms of warfare.
Having argued with a tiny
segment of Travers' thesis, it must
be said that this book is an
outstanding success for three
reasons. First, it is a model of
brevity and clarity. Given the
subject, and the necessity of
reviewing eighteen months of the
most concentrated fighting in the
war, I was astonished that Travers
could make his case so effectively
in 180 pages. On almost every
page, moreover, one finds a
sentence of great pungency. "Yet it
was easier to retreat, even in panic
and chaos, than it was to attack
decisively, so the fact that the
German spring offensives did not
achieve their goals was critical."
(p.107) Secondly, when I tried to
disagree with what Travers wrote,
when I tracked his research in the
notes and checked a quotation, I
found his research impeccable.
Never did he fail to acknowledge a
complication, a detail or a factor
which might have weakened his
case and in the end this
strengthened his argument. Indeed
by the end of the book the
overwhelming impression is one of
thorough research and careful
scholarship. Finally, this book
more than most, is not only a fine
piece of historical analysis, it is a
springboard for thought about
following events.
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or this study of soldiers at
war, it would have been
difficult to pick a more
representative Canadian group
than the Fifth Canadian Infantry
Brigade, part of what insiders were
to call the "Hard-Luck Div," the
2nd Canadian Infantry Division.
Because of his extensive work on
the Maple Leaf Route series (with
Robert Vogel) and his pioneering
analysis (with Bill McAndrew) of
the devastating effects of combat
stress (Battle Exhaustion), Copp is
on familiar terrain in trying, quite
successfully as it turns out, to
restore respectability to narrative
history as an acceptable and
legitimate method of reexamining
certain contentious aspects of the
struggles of the Canadian army in
North-WestEuropefrommid-1944
to late spring 1945. With respect to
leadership, motivation and
performance, Copp, impervious to
controversy, makes effective use of
source materials (though limited
in breadth) to fly in the face of
convention and advance theories
and uncover truths that may not
be well received in certain circles
which for too long have been content
to allow the sleeping dogs of myth
to lie undisturbed. (The word "lie"
may be construed in either of its
two principal senses.)
Copp is part of what is rapidly
becoming a tradition in competent
history circles. He does not set out
deliberately to sculpt clay feet onto
idols made so in the blind heat of
patriotic fervour but using sound
research he and others (too
numerous to mention) have
reduced these epic figures to human

proportions rightly ascribing to
them more faults than qualities
when such is the case and
measuring the effects of these
shortcomings in the bloodied
columns of casualties.
Like Britain in 1914-18,
Canada had its rich crop of
mediocrities in the later war. Some
were put into positions of power
through the "old boys" network
which often proved to be
incestuously nefarious and only
rarely and fortuitously beneficial.
Fortunately, for every Foulkes
there was a Matthews but
frequently not until too high a price
had been paid. Contrary to the
tendentious contentions of TV
personalities who dabble in
hysteria, Canada is blessed with
some historians who seldom flinch
from criticizing when it is
warranted.
However, this does not
preclude their being queried when
they proffer weakly supported
beliefs. Copp, for instance, has
long believed in the mass patriotic
fervour animating the first
volunteers in 1939. In The Brigade,
he questions the belief that the
men of St. Henri (Bonheur
d'occasion; The Tin Flute) all enlist
for jobs after years on
unemployment. Roy bluntly states
that many of her people had found
"le salut dans la guerre."
Admittedly, her Emmannuel
Letourneau is an idealist concerned
for the fate of Poland, and Azari us,
crestfallen at the fall of France,
wants a piece of Hitler's mustache,
but for many, the rifle was the first
instrument of work they had had
in their hands for years. One of
Roy's denizens cynically dismisses
an indifferent democracy now
crying for help from those it had
previously abandoned. This
passage is paralleled almost exactly
in Irene Baird's Waste Heritage
where the central character speaks
in much the same way about the
country that has no use for him
and those who like him at the
moment but which will soon call on
him (and them) to dispel the
gathering clouds of war. Hugh
MacLennan puts these final words
to the tune of"The Old Grey mare"
-"there are no bums in the Jarvis
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